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The purpose of this paper is to show that the economic ideas related to environmental 
sustainability are consistent with centuries of Jewish thought on the matter, as seen through 
Torah, Rabbinic commentaries, Kabbalah, and other teachings.  In particular, we examine 5 
economic principles for moving society toward a more sustainable path: the full cost 
principle; the cost-effectiveness principle; the property rights principle; the sustainability 
principle; and the information principle.  After explaining each economic principle, we relate 
it to Jewish texts and teachings.  Even though the Jewish thinkers of old did not face the 
same environmental challenges present in modern times, their writings are consistent with 
the economic proscriptions that can help achieve environmental sustainability today. 
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RESUME 
Le but de cet article est de montrer que les idées économiques liées à la durabilité de 
l'environnement sont en accord avec les siècles de pensée juive à ce sujet, tels que la Torah, 
les commentaires rabbiniques, la Kabbale et d'autres enseignements. En particulier, nous 
examinons 5 principes économiques pour faire évoluer la société vers une voie plus durable: 
le principe du coût intégral; le principe du rapport coût-efficacité; le principe des droits de 
propriété; le principe de durabilité; et le principe d'information. Après avoir expliqué chaque 
principe économique, nous le relions aux textes et aux enseignements juifs. Même si les 
penseurs juifs d'autrefois n'ont pas fait face aux mêmes défis environnementaux que ceux des 
temps modernes présents, leurs écrits sont compatibles avec les proscriptions économiques 
qui peuvent aider à atteindre la durabilité environnementale aujourd'hui. 
Mots-clés : durabilité environnementale; économie; Éthique juive; Torah; Talmud 
 







In one sense, the concept of "sustainability" is relatively new, only showing up in academic 
and policy circles following conventions and reports by the United Nations in the 1980s.  A 
survey by Caradonna (2017) shows over 5,000 books with the word "sustainable" or 
"sustainability" in their title published since 2000, compared to none before 1976.  Indeed, 
the term sustainability has now become so ubiquitous as to worry some of its overuse or 
misuse.  (Caradonna, 2017)  Literature aside, since the start of the Industrial Revolution in 
the mid 1700s, human activity has put the world on an unsustainable path.   
That path is most dramatically exemplified by climate change.  A review of the assessment 
reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, starting in 1990, shows 
increasing strength in the belief that climate change is not only occurring but it is also largely 
due to anthropogenic sources (IPCC, 2014).  The latest assessment report, in 2014, gives a 
95-100% probability that "unequivocal" climate change is caused by human activity.  Those 
activities include burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, pressures from over-population, and 
land-use change, factors which are largely interrelated and at the root of other environmental 
problems, like air, land, and ocean pollution. Yet, humans are not wired to naturally make 
the behavioral changes needed to stem the rate of climate change, let alone reverse it.  
(Pezzy, 1992; Marshall, 2015) Economists note that humans tend to be "selfish" or self-
interested, so that most decisions are made based on very personal costs and benefits.  In 
addition, humans tend to value those benefits that occur in the here and now over those that 
occur in the future; thus, any sacrifices that have to be made now, whose benefits will not 
occur until the future, are less likely to take place.   
While environmental economists have made suggestions to policymakers on how to harness 
these human tendencies, the suggestions often fall on deaf political ears.  The purpose of this 
paper is to show that the economic principles of environmental sustainability are consistent 
with centuries of Jewish thought on the matter, as seen through Torah, Rabbinic 
commentaries, Kabbalah, and other teachings.  Reinhardt (2014) notes that while the Jewish 
population constitutes just 0.2% of the world's people, Jewish law and tradition have 
strongly influenced Western ethics.  Due to its long and mostly nation-less history, Jewish 
law has developed removed from any institutional authority but with a strong tradition of 
debate, respect for past thinkers, and interpretation based on the place and time.  This has 
made the body of Jewish law flexible and at times abstract.  According to Reinhardt (2014), 
"…even secularists or atheists can take the results of this revelation which is mostly free 
from mere religious rituals, and use it in their reflection on topics like climate change, 
sustainability and an ethics of an open future." (p. 20).  
In particular, Jewish environmental thought recognizes the human propensity toward infinite 
wants; the Torah and its commentaries show humans how to curb those instincts (Levi, 
2005).  Thus it is not surprising that economic proscriptions which provide a practical way to 
overcome the market failures in the environmental sphere also make sense in terms of the 




2. WHAT IS SUSTAINABILITY? 
The commonly accepted definition of sustainability comes from the Brundtland commission 
report from the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development 
(Brundtland, 1987): "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."  (p. 
37)  Environmental sustainability, then, is generally the idea that future generations should 
be left off no worse than current generations.   
From an economics standpoint, consider the broad definition of economics as the study of 
how humans make decisions.  More formally, as any introductory economics student can 
recite, economics is the study of how to allocate scarce resources across unlimited wants and 
needs. The economic problem is brought about by the fact that we live in a resource-
constrained world.  We have "unlimited wants," but limited resources with which to satisfy 
those wants.
1
  If we didn't have resource constraints, we would have no reason to study 
economics; there would be no reason to try to allocate our "scarce" resources across our 
unlimited wants and needs.  More broadly, we wouldn't have to make decisions if we had all 
of the time (which we must remember is a resource), money, and natural and manmade 
resources in the world.    
If we take the commonly accepted definition from the Brundtland commission and combine 
it with the standard definition of economics, we might come up with a very succinct 
definition of sustainability, namely: making choices currently that do not negatively impact 
future generations' ability to make choices.  
The "weak" form of this concept of sustainability is that the current generation can deplete 
natural capital as long as it is able to replace it with physical or man-made capital.  For 
example, if humans depleted the earth's source of rubber but were able to replace it with a 
synthetic substitute, that would be a sustainable use.  On the other hand, the "strong" version 
of sustainability, which may be harder to abide by, suggests that sustainable use of a resource 
is at a rate that does not diminish the resource's ability to regenerate itself for future 
generations.  Using the rubber tree example, users would have to calculate the optimal 
harvesting of rubber so that the trees would have time to regenerate for the next users.   
A question for economists and policymakers is whether or not the weak form of 
sustainability is acceptable, for it assumes that man-made capital and natural capital are 
perfect substitutes for each other.  However, it may be easily argued (Daly, 1990) that often 
this is not the case.  For example, across the US, there are regulations that state that a 
developer can destroy one wetland if he or she replaces it with a man-made wetland.  Studies 
show, however, that the newly created wetland can be a poor substitute for the original one, 
in terms of soil, water hydrology, and vegetation, as well as ecosystem health generally 
(Hunt, n.d.). 
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The Torah establishes that humans may use the earth’s natural resources, but restrictions, 
such as the Jewish dietary laws, are placed on such usage.  The mitzvah (commandment) of 
Tzar Ba’alei Chayim is the general prohibition against causing pain (physical or emotional) 
to animals.   However, it goes further than simply not causing pain and explains  how to 
sustain a population to protect it from extinction.  Deuteronomy  22:6 reads: 
If a bird's nest is before you on your way, in any tree or on the ground, with 
young ones or eggs, and the mother is sitting upon the young, or upon the 
eggs, you shall not take the mother with the young.
2
  
Nachmanides' (Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman  1194-1270) comments on this passage support 
only the strong version of sustainability, with the following interpretation: 
Scripture will not permit a destructive act that will cause the extinction of a 
species even though it has permitted the ritual slaughtering of that species.  
And he who kills mother and children in one day, or takes them while they 
are free to fly away, is considered as if he destroys the species.  
In other words, based on Nachmanides, depleting a natural resource like rubber, even if it 
can be replaced by a synthetic substitute, is not permitted because it would lead to the 
destruction of the species itself.  This suggests that the weak version of sustainability would 
not be consistent with the Torah.  
The biblical principle of migrash, regarding urban planning, supports the strong version of 
sustainability as well.  The migrash principle is seen in Leviticus 25:34 and Numbers 35:1-
15 and designs cities such that a "green belt" of commons is between cities and their 
surrounding fields and vineyards.  Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888) comments 
that "all future times have equal claim to it, and in the same condition that it has been 
received from the past is it to be handed on to the future." (Reinhardt, 2014, p. 30) 
Currently, the world is abiding by neither the strong nor the weak form of sustainability.  
Environmental economists Tietenberg and Lewis (2009) set out 5 principles which might aid 
the world in getting off of its unsustainable path: the full cost principle; the cost-
effectiveness principle; the property rights principle; the sustainability principle; and the 
information principle.  The remainder of this paper will consider each of these principles in 
turn, explain the economic motivation behind each one and then relate it to Jewish texts and 
teachings.  We will then provide a related discussion on the controversial tendency of 
economists to put a value or price on nature.  We will show that this practical necessity is 
also in line with Jewish tradition.  A final section offers conclusions and further thoughts. 
3. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABILITY  
3.1 Full Cost Principle 
The full cost principle states that all market participants (consumers, producers, and 
governments) should recognize and pay all costs in their transactions.  By "all costs," we 
mean not just the market values of goods and services, but also intangible and/or non-market 
costs.  These costs are often considered "social" costs in a broad sense, in which society 
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bears the typical accounting costs of land, labor, capital, and inputs, but also the costs to 
environmental and natural resources.  Indeed, economists distinguish between the so-called 
"private" costs that an individual or organization bears and the "social" costs.   
The idea that decision-makers should include all costs of their actions, not just those that 
directly impact them, is consistent with the ideals of Torah as well.  This is seen most clearly 
in the Torah's consistent theme of being a good "neighbor."  As Rabbi Hirsch points out (in 
Wolff, 2012), the very word "neighbor" in Hebrew - shachan - also means to "dwell."  In 
other words, one cannot live in a place without being concerned with one's neighbors.  Thus 
a good neighbor must consider the social impacts or costs of any action he takes.   
Rabbi Hirsch's interpretation of the Talmud's comments on the Biblical injunction to "Love 
your neighbor as yourself" (Lev 19:18) underscores the environmental perspective.  Noting 
that Rabbi Akiva (50-130 C.E.) sums up the Torah with this verse, Rabbi Hirsch suggests it 
is meant to go beyond human neighbors to include every creature.  Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that Maimonides's rules that dealt with the environment are  included in a section 
of the Mishneh Torah called Hilchot  Shechanim, or laws of neighbors.  The sages of old did 
not distinguish between protecting the neighbors and protecting the environment.   
A full cost accounting of our activities to society would include: externalities, pollution 
control costs and user costs, as follows:   
a) Externalities 
Costs should account for non-marketed effects, which may be positive or negative, referred 
to in economics as externalities.  An externality is sometimes called a "third party" or 
"spillover" effect, in which a transaction takes place between two participants but then a 
bystander (which could literally be a person, but could also be an impact on the environment, 
on health, on society, etc.) is impacted.  There is no market for that effect, so the one who is 
negatively impacted cannot be compensated to tolerate the impact nor pay to stop the impact 
(and similarly for a positive effect, the one who is positively impacted does not need to pay 
to receive the benefit).   
A prototypical example of a negative environmental externality is the pollution that results 
when a power plant burns fossil fuels.  The producer faces costs that include the labor, 
capital, inputs, and so forth, of producing power.  Electricity consumers pay for the power 
they receive.  In a free (unregulated) market, the negative effect of emissions on the 
environment is not accounted for in the transaction between consumer and producer.  An 
example of a positive environmental externality is if a neighbor plants a tree in his yard.  The 
tree may make the neighborhood look nicer or it may provide shade to neighboring homes.  
However, the other neighbors are not obligated to pay for the tree or its upkeep, even though 
they benefit from it.  In both of these examples, there is no market for the externality, 
whether negative or positive, and thus the prices of these activities cannot reflect the added 
costs or benefits.   
Although environmental externalities were not defined as such in the Rabbinic period, 
various examples of environmental and other types of externalities are described in the 
section of the Talmud called "The order of damages" ("Nezikin").  Three tractates within 
that, Bava Kama, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra, deal with damages resulting from 




compensation for them.   Maimonides (Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon 1135-1204)  furthers this 
discussion in his interpretations of laws covering damages in Nizkei Mamon.  
According to economic thought, an activity that produces a negative externality tends to be 
priced "too low," since the market price does not reflect all costs.  Thus the use of this 
activity is more than what would be considered socially optimal.  An activity that causes 
positive externalities is priced "too high" (since if we netted out the extra benefits of them, 
the price would be lower) and thus not enough of this activity occurs.  This defines the 
concept of a "market failure," in which free markets, left on their own, do not achieve an 
optimal outcome.  Instead, a common solution is to have the government intervene to correct 
prices through taxes or subsidies that reflect the external costs or benefits, respectively.  
These so-called Pigovian taxes, after economist A.C. Pigou (1940), are widely viewed as the 
most efficient way to correct an externality, as they bring the value of the externality into the 
decision-making process of the polluter. 
Kleiman (2010) discusses the extent to which the Talmud attempts to insert the value of the 
externality into a transaction, referencing the question of needing to dump cargo that belongs 
to several owners if a ship is at risk of sinking.  This case is seen in Bava Kama 116b: 
A ship which was going by sea, and a gale stood to drown it and they 
lightened her load - they calculate shares in the loss according to the load, 
and do not calculate according to wealth. 
Once the ship is saved, however, compensating the owner of the goods that were thrown 
overboard is shared by the other owners in proportion to the weights of their respective 
items.  The justification for this is that the sum of the weight of everyone's cargo contributed 
to the danger to the ship.  This compensation method effectively puts a weight tax on 
shipping goods, to try to pay for the externality caused by too much weight.  This is similar 
to the Pigovian tax, since it creates a tax equal to the value of the externality.  The main 
difference, as Kleiman (2010) points out, it that a Pigovian tax is imposed before negative 
damages occur, while shipping damages in the Talmudic period would only be assessed after 
the fact.     
A second policy solution is to have the government regulate the production of a good that 
produces a negative externality, by either limiting the production or specifying a cleaner 
technology that must be used in the production process.  This does not address the question 
of correcting prices and is generally considered a less efficient solution.  However, there are 
times when it is still the best policy, such as when dealing with hazardous materials or other 
instances in which the optimal amount of a pollutant is simply zero.  In the Biblical and 
Rabbinic periods, such "top down" policies were likely more common, largely due to the 
administrative ease of imposing them.  A less sophisticated and less centralized market 
system would further make it difficult to impose incentive-based solutions (e.g., carbon tax, 
"green" subsidies, or tradable pollution permits) in those days. 
Sefer Nezikin set out many  regulations to control externalities, and the Talmud Bava Batra 
2:9 even regulates where polluting activities must take place:  
They must distance animal carcasses, graves and tanneries from a town by 
fifty cubits. And they may not make a tannery except to the east of a city. 
Rabbi Akiva says: One may set it up on any side except the west, and one 




In fact, in Bava Batra, most of the activities which cause externalities, from digging cisterns 
that may damage a neighbor's land or water, to operating threshing floors that might release 
particulates into the air, are dealt with via regulations and controls.  Activities might be 
confined to certain places (such as the tanneries as mentioned above); potentially hazardous 
equipment, such as ovens, had to be built in a certain way to reduce risk; and even some 
agricultural practices were circumscribed (such as not planting leeks and onions near each 
other, lest one contaminate the other).  Foreshadowing today's bee problem, the Talmud even 
requires that mustard plants be kept away from domesticated bees, so that the bees' honey 
would not be soured.  (Wolff, 2012)   
b) Pollution control costs 
Complete costs also take into account the costs to society of controlling or curbing pollution.  
While we may typically think of these control costs as costs to the producer, we have to 
consider these societal costs for several reasons: first, it may be that the producer is able to 
pass on these costs to the consumer, such that the consumer ultimately bears the burden of 
the costs of controlling pollution. Secondly, even if the producer does not pass on those 
costs, the producer may have to cut back on production, which hurts would-be customers.  In 
addition, if the producer cuts back on production, that could lead to job losses, with rippling 
effects through the economy.  Relatedly, there are opportunity costs associated with 
controlling pollution in terms of money invested in cleaner technologies or inputs that could 
have been spent elsewhere in the production process.  Thus economists weigh the (marginal) 
costs of polluting (in terms of the damages wrought) with the (marginal) costs to control that 
pollution.  This rule tends to imply that the "optimal" level of pollution is rarely zero; rather, 
in order to continue to have economic activity, some level of pollution must be tolerated.
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This concept is reflected in the suggestion by Wolff (2012) that "The Torah negotiates the 
dynamic balance between providing people with the freedom they need to act in this world in 
order to meet their physical needs and wants, and protecting neighbors (society and the 
environment) from the damage these actions may cause." (p.3) The second chapter of Bava 
Batra supports this idea that there must be a balance between the costs of polluting with the 
cost of controlling pollution.  In this chapter, there is an acknowledgment that we need to 
conduct activities for our physical well-being, while protecting our environment.   
c) User costs 
The user costs of an activity also need to be included in the full cost of an activity.  In other 
words, when a person uses a non-renewable resource, he or she is preventing future users 
from enjoying that resource.  The contrast between surface water allocation and groundwater 
allocation illustrates this point.  Surface water (water in reservoirs, rivers, lakes, etc) is 
considered to be renewable, since it is replenished (we hope) by rain and snowmelt.  Thus as 
long as a community's use of that body of water does not exceed the rate of replenishment, 
future users' ability to use that water is not in jeopardy (Note: we are referring to water 
quantity in this example, not water quality).  On the other hand, groundwater (water from 
aquifers) allocation is typically modeled as a resource that does not replenish itself as 
quickly as humans deplete it.  Thus, any use of water from this source is depriving a future 
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user from accessing that water.  The opportunity cost for that future user - ie., the value of 
the water that the future user never gets - must be accounted for.   
The concept of user cost, or lost future benefits, is less explicit in Jewish thought, but we can 
glean some ideas from the Talmud.  Though distasteful in our times, there are lengthy 
discussions of how to compensate a Hebrew slave and his owner, in the event that someone 
injures the slave.  In Bava Kama 86a:9,  if the injury is a permanent one (such as the loss of a 
hand), the guilty party has to compensate the slave for the "major loss of livelihood."  Rava 
(280-352 CE) says that the slave would then take the compensation and purchase land, the 
profits of which will go to the master for the rest of the slave's period of slavery.  In other 
words, the master is compensated for losing future earnings from the slave's labor.    
Economists widely agree that if the price of human activities reflected all of the costs that 
they impose on society, including the above-mentioned costs
4
, environmentally damaging 
activities would decrease.  In other words, "getting prices right," or providing the proper 
incentives to economic actors, is a big step in moving toward a more sustainable future. 
The Torah supports this concept by teaching the importance of proper and "just" 
measurements in Lev. 19:36.  "You shall have true scales, true weights, a true ephah (a unit 
of dry measure), and a true hin (a unit of liquid measure)." To do otherwise would be to 
commit a "perversion of justice." (Lev. 19:35)  
 
3.2 Cost Effectiveness Principle 
Once a particular environmental goal is set, the cost effectiveness principle demands that the 
goal is achieved at the lowest cost possible.   Following this principle results in two benefits: 
it limits waste (i.e., excess expenditures to meet the goal), which, in turn, can make a policy 
more politically feasible. 
An oft-cited environmental principle from Torah is Baal Tashchit, the prohibition against 
destructive waste. In Deuteronomy, chapter 20 deals with laws of warfare.  Verses 19-20 
state: 
When in your war against a city you have to besiege it a long time in order 
to capture it, you must not destroy its trees, wielding the ax against them. 
You may eat of them, but you must not cut them down. Are trees of the field 
human to withdraw before you into the besieged city? Only trees that you 
know do not yield food may be destroyed; you may cut them down for 
constructing siege works against the city that is waging war on you, until it 
has been reduced. 
Maimonides expands this prohibition against wastefulness in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Kings 
6:10, in which he writes that Jews further should not destroy household goods, tear clothes, 
demolish buildings, stop up a spring, or purposefully ruin food. The economist’s desire for 
efficiency is thus consistent with this admonition against wastefulness.   Hillel (~110 BCE - 
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10 CE) famously re-frames the "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," 
instruction by turning it into the negative form: "Don't do to others that which is hateful to 
you."  This provides further emphasis on considering (and therefore minimizing) the costs of 
one's actions. (Wolff, 2012) 
While the environmental economist would propose that cost effectiveness is best achieved 
through incentive-based programs (for example, pollution taxes or marketable pollution 
permits), solutions to environmental problems as seen in Jewish thought fall under the more 
costly "command and control" regulations.  As mentioned earlier and elaborated in Oakman 
(1991), ancient economies were not well-suited for using market-based tools to change 
people's behavior.  As Oakman reminds us, before the Industrial Revolution, economies 
looked very different from today's economic systems.  Markets had a limited role in people's 
day-to-day lives, and trade arrangements were controlled by monarchs.  For most people, 
agricultural activity was their mainstay, and most production was intended for home 
consumption.  While households paid taxes, they were calculated in an unsophisticated way, 
with the purpose of raising revenue for public spending and redistribution (in addition to 
creating wealth for the rulers) but not influencing or curbing behavior.   
In Kleiman's comments to Bava Kamma 116b, the above-cited question of how to 
compensate owners of ship cargo jettisoned to save the ship, he notes that obtaining 
efficiency is not the main goal of Talmudic decisions.  Rather, distributive justice, or equity, 
is of paramount importance throughout the Talmud.  Nevertheless, since owners of heavier 
items (therefore causing a greater risk of sinking), as opposed to more valuable items, had to 
pay a higher penalty suggests a consideration toward efficiency and not equity.   
 
3.3 Property rights principle 
Before discussing property rights and regimes, it may be helpful to define property.  As 
clarified by Bromley (1992), property is a social construct that results in an accrual of 
benefits to the owner.  A property right is "a claim to a benefit stream that the state will agree 
to protect..." (p. 2).  Property rights regimes may be classified into four categories: private 
property, state-owned property, common property and open access property.  Under stringent 
conditions,  private property may be the best way to ensure environmental stewardship in 
today's society.  When a person owns his property, he has the highest motivation to protect it 
from environmental degradation.  This assumes (and this may be a strong assumption) that 
the owner uses the property for socially-useful production and in ways that do not harm 
society.  Among land tenure regimes, common property - in which members of a community 
collectively own and manage a resource - was historically a sustainable practice.  For 
example, consider communal property in traditional societies, in which all members of the 
society have a vested interest in protecting a resource.  In today's world, however, population 
pressures and pressures from modernization (including political biases and encroachment of 
private property) have come to threaten these practices (Bromley, 1992).   
In order for property rights to be effective, they must be exclusive, so that all of the benefits 
and costs of the property accrue to the owner; they must be transferable, so that the rights 
can be passed on or sold to another owner; and, they must be enforceable, so that no one can 
take another's rights by force (Bromley, 1992).  Without these three conditions in place, a so-




owner is not assured that she will reap the benefits of an improvement that she pays for on 
her property, she may not make that investment.  Similarly, if she is worried that her 
property may be unlawfully seized at any moment, it may not be worth it for her to try to 
improve it. 
An added principle of property rights is that ownership of property (whether private, state or 
common) should be as close to the property as possible (Bromley, 1992).  If local 
communities had the opportunity to derive direct benefits from the resources in their midst 
(for example, by owning a forest or the animals living within it), they would have a greater 
incentive to protect it.  While the world as a whole might also benefit from that protection, 
the stewardship will be more effective at a local level. 
In some cases, private, state or common ownership is logistically impossible, for example, in 
the case of ownership of the air. This class of property is referred to as “open access” (res 
nullius) resources, in which no one owns the property and therefore no one has an incentive 
to protect, preserve or otherwise sustainably manage it.  In such instances, the government 
needs to provide incentives (either positive or negative) to protect the resources and 
distribute the benefits to the public.   This assumes that the government keeps in mind local 
conditions and customs, as well as its own limited resources and capabilities. 
Jewish commentary on property rights takes two forms: there is a theological perspective 
that all property belongs to God, but there are also laws designed to protect various property 
rights of people.  In our analysis about what kinds of property rights are best for 
environmental stewardship, we will consider these two aspects in turn. 
The Psalms are a good starting point for the theological perspective of ownership: Psalm 24 
begins: “The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof; the world, and they that dwell 
therein.”  In other words, everything on the earth belongs to God and there is no such thing 
as private ownership by people.  In that case, it would also call for the strong version of 
sustainability, since if we, as humans, do not own any resources, we cannot use them up nor 
attempt to replace them with substitutes.  Psalm 115 modifies this concept of ownership 
slightly by saying, “the heavens (or the sky) belong to God but God has given the dry land to 
man.”  If we were to accept the possibility that land (earth) can be possessed by humans, we 
might consider that humans will have an incentive to preserve their land.  That will still leave 
the question of what would be people’s incentive to protect the waters (not directly 
mentioned) and the air (under a loose interpretation that the air is part of the sky/heavens).   
The Misheh Torah 13:12 provides some insights into the consequences for hurting someone 
accidentally (an “externality”) by suggesting that the “owner cannot be held liable by an 
earthly court.”  In other words, God would mete out the punishment.  This threat is one that 
may not be taken as seriously or literally in the modern world, as recognized in Pope 
Francis’ 2015 encyclical, Laudato Si', on the environment.  The economist’s answer to this is 
to treat God’s property effectively like open access property – that is, property that no one 
owns and no one can be prevented from using (“non-excludable”).  The solution to open 
access resources is to use government policy to preserve and protect the resource, through 
both regulations and price incentives (e.g., taxation and subsidies).  The perhaps bold 




to take control of it.  If God is not the authority that humans are paying attention to, then the 
government has to take the authoritative role
5
.   
On the other hand, there is no shortage of commentary and Jewish law on various types of 
property that do belong to people.  Elman (2018/1958) summarizes Jewish law on property 
rights by noting there are three kinds of property: property that is owned by one or more 
persons (including common ownership); property that is “ownerless,” which is to say, it was 
once owned by someone, but that person either gave it up, lost it, died without an heir, or 
something similar; and, property that belongs to the Temple.  These designations are 
referring to property that can be privately owned, as defined above.   
Yet, there are examples of property that might be considered open access.  In Bava Metzia 
11a, the discussion surrounds how to assign ownership to wild animals or birds that cross 
one’s property.  The answer has to do with whether or not the animal or bird is able-bodied 
or if it is wounded or unable to walk or fly away.  The beginning verses of Chapter 21 in 
Deuteronomy discuss the problem of a dead body found on land that is in between two cities.  
Because no one owns the land where the body was found, the section discusses how to figure 
out who is responsible for it.  In the end, the solution is to measure the distance from the 
body to each city and the closest city is the one that has to perform an odd ritual regarding 
the blood of a red heifer.   
There is yet one more example of open access property, referred to above in the principle of 
the migrash.  In Leviticus 25:34 and Numbers 35:1-15, the Levites are instructed to have two 
protected bands of land around their cities. The inner one is primarily to beautify the city 
with plants, but no agriculture or construction, while the outer band is for agriculture only.  
The rabbis in the Talmudic period decided that this rule should apply to all cities in Israel, 
not just those of the Levites (Arachin, 33b). 
All of these examples provide evidence that even in Biblical times, open access land was 
considered important, while raising questions of whom to assign responsibility to. 
Interestingly, the classic economics example of open access resources comes from the mid-
19th Century economist William Forster Lloyd, who discussed the problem of livestock 
grazing on open land (then refered to as “the Commons”, but not to be confused with 
"common property" as described above).  The so-called "Tragedy of the Commons" was then 
popularized by Hardin (1968) and is still regularly used in environmental policy and 
environmental economics courses today. This problem was already thought about by 
Maimonides in Hilchot Nizkei Mamon (damage to property):  if an animal damages 
someone's property (eg., fruit) the owner of the animal has to pay for the damage.  This 
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 This possibly heretical statement relies on the philosophy of Public Finance, the branch of 
Economics that analyzes government intervention in the economy.  Such intervention is justified 
to correct for market failures that occur when the free market does not lead to the best outcome 




3.4  Sustainability principle 
The sustainability principle ensures intergenerational equity; that is, that there is a fair 
distribution of resources between the current and future generations. Human nature, 
however, prevents this from occurring in a free market.  After all, we are programmed to 
prefer the "here and now" to the future.  That is why we need to be paid extra (ie., interest) to 
delay receiving and spending money immediately.  This is partly due to our sense of instant 
gratification, but also due to the uncertainties that the future brings (e.g., what if I am saving 
for a tomorrow that never comes?).  
This concept makes sure that decisions are based not just on weighing current costs and 
benefits but on all future ones as well.  This calculation is complicated by the uncertainties 
associated with future cost- benefit flows as well as the need to account for the time value of 
money (and therefore, discounting future flows). 
The Babylonian Talmud considers this aspect of making investments in nature whose 
"payoff" will not occur until future generations, as exemplified in Tractate Ta'anit 23a: 
One day, [Honi the Circle Maker] was going along the road. He saw a man 
planting a carob tree. [Honi] said to him, “How many years does it take to 
bear fruit?” [The man] said to him, “Seventy years.” [Honi] said to him, “Is 
it clear to you that you will live [another] seventy years?” [The man] said to 
him, “I found a world full of carob trees. Just as my ancestors planted for 
me, so I plant for my children.” [Honi] sat down and ate. Drowsiness came 
to him. He fell asleep. A rock formation rose around him, he became hidden, 
and he slept for seventy years. When he rose, he saw that man picking [fruit] 
from [the tree]. [Honi] said to him, “Are you the one who planted [this 
tree]?” [The man] said to him, “I am his grandson.”  (Babylonian Talmud, 
Tractate Ta’anit 23a) 
Honi's skepticism and doubt continue to modern generations and humans have already put 
intergenerational equity in peril.  In order to move toward restoring some of that equity, 
some of the wealth we have accrued to-date needs to be transferred to future generations. 
The Alaska Permanent Fund (APFC, n.d.) is an example which weakly approximates such a 
transfer.  It takes some of Alaska's oil revenues and invests them into a fund, whose returns 
are partially remitted to Alaskan citizens.  In whatever form such a transfer take place, some 
level of government would have to take charge of this endeavor. 
The rabbis did not have such a policy in place, but Midrash Kohelet Rabbah 7:13 contains an 
admonition from God:  
When God created the first human beings, God led them around the Garden 
of Eden and said: “Look at my works! See how beautiful they are—how 
excellent! For your sake I created them all. See to it that you do not spoil 
and destroy My world; for if you do, there will be no one else to repair it.”  
This warning provides an awareness of the need to preserve resources for future generations, 
though it does not offer a way of ensuring sustainable behavior.  In this passage, the 
punishment for not doing so is that neither God nor anyone else will come to the rescue.  




Israelites if they do not follow God's commandments.  Most of these punishments start with 
consequences to the natural environment. 
 
3.5. Information principle 
People need to know why they should care about the environment.  They need to understand 
why their individual actions matter and how their individual actions contribute to collective 
success.   Following that, people need to understand which choices are sustainable and which 
are not.  
Information can be shared through direct education, public awareness campaigns, 
environmental journalism, etc.   The exact form of this information sharing is dependent on 
the environmental issue involved and on the resources (both financial and in terms of levels 
of personal income and education) within the location. 
While the Torah and its commentaries do not specifically address the topic of 
"environmental education," so much of the history and culture of Judiasm is enveloped in 
learning, that the information principle seems to hold in any context.  From the regularly 
chanted "V'ahavta" prayer ("teach these words to your children," in Deuteronomy 6:7), to the 
teaching structure of the Passover seder, learning is everywhere in the Jewish tradition.   
In modern times, a vast number of Jewish organizations are specifically devoted to 
environmental awareness, drawing upon many of the same texts analyzed in this paper.  
Designated environmental organizations, such as Hazon, COEJL, Jewcology, Aitzym, and 
Wilderness Torah are joined by other social justice organizations like Truah and the 
Religious Action Center in their pursuit of combining education and action.  All 
denominations of Judaism include environmental programming, connected to Jewish sources 
and holidays.  Thus, even if the sages of old did not explicitly specify it, modern Judaism 
practices the information principle with regard to building knowledge about the 
environment. 
4. ASIDE ON "PUTTING A PRICE ON NATURE" 
In order to make effective decisions about using or protecting the environment and natural 
resources, we have to put values on goods and services that are non-marketed.  This raises 
both practical and ethical concerns.  Economists have devised a variety of survey and 
statistical techniques to get around the question of how to measure items for which there is 
no market (Champ, Boyle & Brown, 2013).  Of greater interest in this paper is the 
desirability to put a price on natural resources, human health, quality of life, etc.  There is no 
shortage of critiques (Kelman, 2001; Sandel, 2013) of the economist's method of valuing 
precisely those parts of life which would be de-valued if we were to put a dollar figure on 
them.    
Thus we must address such a concern, from the starting point that the use of dollars is merely 
a way of putting all values into a common denominator for the purposes of weighing difficult 
decisions.  Indeed, in a world of constrained government budgets, policymakers must have 
some common medium of exchange to decide among competing projects.  In reality, all of us 
at least implicitly put a value on many intangible items, including our own lives, such as 




standards on our household goods.  No one is suggesting actually commodifying these 
resources, but from a practical perspective, decisions are more easily made if we can attempt 
to put values on all relevant components.  
Jewish tradition supports this need to put a value on nature.  This is seen in the Oral Law, as 
codified in the Mishnah, for example, where the literal words of the Torah are interpreted in 
a way to give clarity to society.  For example, the phrase "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth," (Exodus 21:24) is not meant literally, but rather, that a victim should be compensated 
for the value of what was lost to him or her.  
Turning again to Baal Tashchit, commentaries by Rashi (1040-1105) and Ibn Ezra (1089-
1167) suggest that valuing the environment is nothing new.  These two scholars had different 
interpretations of the sentence: “Are trees of the field human to withdraw before you into the 
besieged city?"  Rashi translates “ki” to mean “perhaps”, as in "perhaps the tree is like a 
human" and so it should be protected.  He suggests we would value the tree for its own sake.  
In economics terms, this is the concept of "existence value."  Ibn Ezra interprets “ki” to mean 
“for” as in "for the trees of the field are human."  In this view, the tree provides a livelihood 
or sustenance for humans.  In economics, this is the idea of “use value:” we might be able to 
put a price on a non-marketed good, like a tree, by the worth of the goods and services it 
provides us (e.g., its fruit, its shade, its shelter for animals, etc.).  
Lamm (1971) also discusses the concept of valuation in his commentary to Baal Tashchit. 
He notes that exemptions to the rule of not cutting down fruit trees include the possibility 
that the fruit of the tree isn't as valuable as the timber itself.  If a fruit tree is of "inferior" 
quality and is damaging nearby, more valuable trees, it is also permissible to cut down the 
tree.  These examples show that valuing nature helps to make practical decisions. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Mankind's anthropocentric view of the earth and our relationship to it, especially when it 
comes to the utilization of its natural resources, may be traced back to the Hebrew Bible.  In 
Genesis 1:28, following the creation of humans, the text reads: “And God blessed them 
(humans); and said unto them: 'Be fruitful, and multiply, fill the earth, and subdue it; and 
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living 
thing that creeps upon the earth.'”  It is this verse which has paved the way for humans to see 
ourselves as the pinnacle of creation and masters of the planet 
However, this concept contradicts our above review of Jewish concerns for the environment 
and its sustainability.  It further suggests that our wanton behavior has rested on this one 
word "subdue," coming from the Hebrew chiboosh.  Klein and Wasser (2010) agree that this 
is a misinterpretation, particularly following the commentaries of R. Obadiah b. Jacob 
Sforno (1475-1550) and Nachmanides.   In their commentaries to Chapter 2, verse 19, they 
suggest that  Adam does not assign names to each animal but rather "discovers" each name 
as he observes each animal.  This suggests a sensitivity toward animals rather than dominion 
over them. 
Given the lack of vowels in the written Torah, we propose a different pronunciation of this 
word, chaboosh, meaning "preserve."  While this word is usually used in the context of 
preserving food, we would hope for a reinterpretation of verse 28 that we should preserve 




citizens today can see that the principles of the Hebrew Bible are wholly consistent with the 
policy proscriptions set out by environmental economists.  It is our hope that with this 
recognition, it will make it easier for societies to make the changes necessary to protect and 
preserve the environmental and natural resources around us.  
REFERENCES 
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation. n.d. "History of the Alaska Permanent Fund." 
Available at:https://apfc.org/who-we-are/history-of-the-alaska-permanent-fund/ 
Brundtland, G.H. (1987). Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development: Our Common Future. United Nations/Oxford University Press. Available at: 
http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf 
Caradonna, J. (2017). "Sustainability: A New Historiography."  Routledge Handbook on the 
History of Sustainability. Taylor & Francis. E-book edition. 
Champ, P.A., K.J.Boyle, and T.C. Brown, eds. (2017). A Primer on Non-Market Valuation. 
Springer. 2nd edition (e-book).  
Elman, P. ed. (2018/1958). An introduction to Jewish law. London: Lincolns-Prager. pp. 44-
52. Available at: https://louisjacobs.org/articles/property-jewish-law/ 
Gruber, J. (2016).  Public Finance and Public Policy. 5th Edition.  New York: Worth 
Publishers. 
Hardin, Garrett. (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162 (3859):1243-1248. 
Hunt, Randall J. (n.d.) "Do Created Wetlands Replace the Wetlands that are Destroyed?" US 
Department of the Interior, US Geological Service, Fact Sheet FS-246-95. Available at: 
https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/1996/0246/report.pdf 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2014). Climate Change 2014: 
Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. 
Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Kelman, S. (1981). "Cost-Benefit Analysis. An Ethical Critique (with Replies)." AIE 
Journal:33-40. 
Kleiman, E. (2010). Externalities and Public Goods in the Talmud. The Oxford Handbook of 
Judaism and the Environment (Electronic Resource). Aaron Levin, ed.  Oxford University 
Press. 
Klein, Y.L. and J.Weiser. (2010). Jewish Environmental Ethics. The Oxford Handbook of 
Judaism and the Environment (Electronic Resource). Aaron Levin, ed.  Oxford University 
Press. 
Lamm, N. (1971). “Ecology in Jewish Law and Theology.” Faith and Doubt: Studies in 
Traditional Jewish Thought. Brooklyn, NY: KTAV Publishing House.  
Marshall, G. (2015). Don't Even Think About It: Why Our Brains Are Wired to Ignore 




Oakman, D.E. (1991). The Ancient Economy in the Bible, Biblical Theology Bulletin: 
Journal of Bible and Culture, 21(1): 34-39. 
Reinhardt, J. (2014). An Ethics of Sustainability and Jewish Law? De Ethica. A Journal of 
Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics, 1(1): 17-35. 
Available at: http://www.de-ethica.com/archive/articles/v1/i1/a04/de_ethica_14v1i1a04.pdf 
Sandel, M.J. (2013). What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Tietenberg, T. and L. Lewis. (2009). Environment and Natural Resource Economics. 
Pearson. 8th Edition. 
Levi, Y. (2005). Ecology: A Jewish Perspective.  Available at: 
http://www.aish.com/h/15sh/i/48967316.html 
Wolff, Akiva. (2012). "Being a Good Neighbor." Torah Musings.   
https://www.torahmusings.com/2012/12/being-a-good-neighbor 
 
